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Introduction and summary
The news media frequently suggest that American
workers have suffered a significant decline in job
security during the 1990s. Of course, planned
and actual employment reductions at major cor-
porations such as AT&T, IBM, and General Motors
have been important stories. But articles such
as those in the 1996 New York Times book  The
Downsizing of America go beyond reporting indi-
vidual cases of layoffs to suggest that there has
been a fundamental change in the employment
relationship. According to such articles, workers
in general have suffered a loss of job security,
and long-term employment relationships are a
thing of the past. Moreover, such articles claim
that this decreased job security has left workers
feeling more anxious about their futures.
The perception of declining job security is
shared by many policymakers and other analysts,
who believe worker anxiety to be a major reason
wage inflation in the 1990s has remained modest
in the face of historically low levels of unemploy-
ment. Perhaps most famously, Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan testified to
Congress in February 1997 that “atypical restraint
on compensation increases has been evident for
a few years now and appears to be mainly the
consequence of greater worker insecurity.”1
Former U.S. Labor Secretary Robert Reich recently
made much the same point when he wrote, “Wages
are stuck because people are afraid to ask for a
raise. They are afraid they may lose their job.”2
Labor economists, however, have often been
skeptical of claims of widespread declines in job
stability and security. They note that media accounts
are long on anecdotes and short on evidence
based on nationally representative survey data.
Moreover, the most carefully executed studies
using scientifically designed survey data collected
through the early 1990s often reached conclusions
quite at odds with media reports. For instance,
Diebold, Neumark, and Polsky (1997) concluded
that “aggregate job retention rates have remained
stable.” Similarly, Farber (1998) found that “there
has been no systematic change in the overall distri-
bution of job duration over the last two decades.”
More recently, however, researchers have
begun to analyze survey data from the mid-1990s,
and conclusions somewhat more in line with
media reports are emerging. For instance,
Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen (1997) reported
that “there is some evidence that job stability
declined modestly in the first half of the 1990s.
Moreover, the relatively small aggregate changes
mask rather sharp declines in stability for workers
with more than a few years of tenure.” Similarly,
Farber (1997b) concluded that “after controlling
for demographic characteristics, the fraction of
workers reporting more than ten and more than
20 years of tenure fell substantially after 1993 to
its lowest level since 1979.” Thus job stability—
the tendency of workers and employers to form
long-term bonds—seems to be declining some-
what. Moreover, evidence of significant change
is especially apparent in more direct measures
of worker security, such as Farber’s (1997a) tabu-
lations of the number of workers reporting invol-
untary job loss. The extent of changes in job tenure,
turnover, and displacement reported in these
more recent studies is much too modest to justify
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the most sensationalistic news reports. Neverthe-
less, some decline in job security, especially for
workers who have attained significant seniority,
now seems reasonably clear.
In this article, we review some of the findings
of this research on job stability and job security.
We then present some new tabulations of rates
of job loss for high seniority workers based on
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Displaced
Worker Surveys (DWS). Next, we look directly at
workers’ own perceptions of their job security
using data from the National Opinion Research
Center’s General Social Survey (GSS). Finally, we
attempt to relate our measures of displacement
and worker anxiety to wage growth by examining
time-series data for the nine U.S. census divisions.
Our tabulations of annual displacement rates
from the DWS focus on workers with five or more
years of tenure. We find that among such workers,
job loss due to “shift or position abolished,” which
among the surveys’ possible reasons for job loss
comes closest to capturing the notion of “down-
sizing,” increased quite dramatically from annual
rates of two tenths or three tenths of a percent
throughout the 1980s to a range of six tenths or
seven tenths of a percent in the mid-1990s. Deter-
mining the trend in displacement more generally
is complicated by changes in the DWS. However,
our preferred estimates suggest that overall dis-
placement rates were higher in 1995, the most
recent year for which we have data, than at any
time since the data began in 1979. We estimate a
1995 displacement rate of about 3.4 percent for
workers with five or more years of tenure. By com-
parison, the rate for 1982, which was in the middle
of a severe recession, was only about 2.5 percent.
We consider this a substantial increase in the risk
of displacement for high-seniority workers.
We also find that displacement has become
somewhat more “democratic” in the 1990s. Previ-
ously, high-seniority workers who were highly
educated, were in white-collar jobs, or were em-
ployed in the service producing industries were
relatively immune to displacement. More recently,
however, displacement rates for these groups
have risen especially fast, while those for some
groups who had high rates of displacement in the
1980s, such as those with at most a high school
education, those in blue-collar occupations, and
those working in manufacturing, rose less or even
fell relative to their peaks in the early 1980s. As
a result of this increased democratization of dis-
placement, many more workers may now con-
sider themselves at risk for job loss.
The GSS data suggest that workers’ own per-
ceptions of their job security have also declined.
The fraction of workers not responding “very
unlikely” to the question, “How likely is it that
you will lose your job in the next year?,” rose
from about 31 percent in 1989 to about 40 percent
in 1996, the most recent year for which data are
available. The 1996 figure approximately matches
the highest reading since this question began to
be asked in 1977. The 1996 reading is especially
remarkable given that unemployment was gen-
erally below 6 percent, while in 1982, when such
a level of anxiety was previously reached, unem-
ployment was nearly 10 percent. One should not,
however, exaggerate the extent to which workers’
anxiety over job loss has increased. The main
change has been an increase in the number of
workers responding that it is “not too likely”
rather than “very unlikely” that they will lose
their jobs. The percentages of workers respond-
ing that it is “fairly likely” or “very likely” have
risen more modestly.
With a few exceptions, the groups of workers
who have experienced the largest increases in
displacement rates have also had the largest
increases in reported probabilities of job loss.
For instance, an increase in perceived likelihood
of job loss has been especially great among white-
collar workers. Perceived job security has actually
increased for blue-collar workers. Another inter-
esting finding concerns the relationship between
workers’ perceptions of their job security and the
use of computers in their industry. In the early
1980s, workers in industries with greater com-
puter usage felt more secure on average than other
workers. By the mid-1990s, however, the relation-
ship had reversed, with workers in industries
with greater computer usage feeling less secure.
Finally, we attempted to judge to what extent
our findings of an increase in displacement rates
and workers’ perceptions of their chances of
job loss are related to changes in aggregate
wages. Standard short-run Phillips curve analy-
ses such as Gordon (1997) have tended to predict
higher levels of wage inflation than have actually
occurred in the last two or three years. Though
significant forecast errors are nothing new for
such models,3 the importance of the question to
policymakers has led to a great deal of specula-
tion as to why wage inflation has remained sub-
dued. Our findings and those of other researchers,
which suggest that job security has declined in
recent years, add some plausibility to the caseFederal Reserve Bank of Chicago 19
that worker anxiety has played a role in restrain-
ing wage inflation.
However, one could easily point to other
recent changes in labor markets or elsewhere in
the economy that might be affecting wage growth.4
Why should one particular change—that towards
reduced job security—be considered the key fac-
tor? To make a more convincing case for the im-
portance of worker insecurity, one would want
to observe that in the past, when displacement
or anxiety was high relative to unemployment,
wage inflation had also been subdued. Moreover,
to obtain any sense of the quantitative importance
of worker insecurity in restraining wage inflation,
one needs to examine historical evidence. Unfor-
tunately, with annual measures of displacement
and insecurity that go back only to the late 1970s,
there is not much hope of extracting such infor-
mation from the U.S. time-series data.
Our strategy is to look cross-sectionally as
well as over time and ask whether census regions
that have had higher displacement rates or worker
perceptions of insecurity have tended to have
lower wage growth. Such a strategy parallels
the “wage curve” analyses of Blanchflower and
Oswald (1994), although, as in Blanchard and
Katz (1997), we employ the traditional Phillips
curve specification in which the change in wages,
rather than their level, is related to unemploy-
ment and measures of job security.
We pool separate data from the nine census
regions to estimate the effect of displacement
rates or perceptions of insecurity on forecasts of
wage inflation. We find that, holding constant
the unemployment rate, higher values of both
displacement and worker insecurity are associ-
ated with lower wage growth. However, even
with the additional source of data variation that
comes from pooling the separate census divisions,
our estimates of the magnitude of these effects
are imprecise. Indeed, if we allow for the possi-
bility that there may be some permanent, unmea-
sured characteristics of regions that are associated
with different levels of wage growth, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the true effect of job
security on wages is zero and that estimates the
size of those we obtain could have arisen by
chance. Nonetheless, our best estimates suggest
that increases in displacement rates and workers’
own anxiety about their job security could be
responsible for restraining wage growth by
about three tenths to seven tenths of a percent-
age point per year during the mid-1990s. Such
an effect would explain all or most of the puzzle
of lower than expected wage inflation.
Previous research on turnover
and displacement
The  New York Times describes its book on
downsizing as putting “a human face on a historic
predicament that is as ubiquitous as it is painful.”5
A large body of research demonstrates that job
loss is painful, at least for workers who have at-
tained significant tenure.6 For example, Jacob-
son, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993c) found that
even six years after job loss, earnings losses
among a sample of Pennsylvania workers dis-
placed in the early 1980s were still equal to about
25 percent of their predisplacement earnings
levels. What has been somewhat less clear to
researchers is whether job loss has become any
more ubiquitous in recent years.
It is helpful to divide the relevant research
into two parts—that on job stability and that on
job security. By stability we mean the tendency
for workers and firms to develop long-term
relationships. Research on job stability questions
the many media accounts claiming that such long-
term employment relationships have gone the
way of buggy whips. By security we mean workers’
ability to remain in employment relationships
as long as their own performance is satisfactory.
Research on job security asks whether there has
been an increase in involuntary job loss due to
reasons beyond workers’ control. Job stability
depends on workers’ own choices, in addition
to the factors that influence job security. For
instance, if a group of workers increase their
commitment to the labor force or to their partic-
ular employers, then their job stability may rise
even if they are increasingly subject to threats
of displacement. As we shall see, research sug-
gests a larger 1990s decline in job security than
in job stability.
In our view, trends in job security are much
more relevant to the discussion of whether spe-
cial factors might be restraining wage inflation
than are trends in job stability. Indeed, if declines
in job stability are less dramatic than declines in
job security, it must largely be because workers
are less likely to leave jobs voluntarily, and a
decreased tendency to quit jobs may itself signal
worker insecurity. Nevertheless, we begin with
a short account of research on job stability.
The starting point for much of the research
on job stability is the distribution of job tenure.Economic Perspectives 20
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Most of what is known about this distribution
derives from a series of supplements to the Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS).7 As an illustration,
figure 1 displays the distribution of job tenure
for employed men between the ages of 35 and
44. These data were collected from the most recent
Mobility Supplement to the CPS, which was con-
ducted in February 1996. The figure shows that
the most common tenure levels are the shortest—
for example, less than one year and between one
and two years—with a roughly monotonic decline
in the number of workers with successively longer
tenure. Nevertheless, there are many workers
with substantial levels of job tenure. For men in
the 35 to 44 age group, the median tenure is about
6.1 years. Moreover, about 33 percent of such
workers have been in their current jobs at least
ten years and about 22 percent have been in their
current jobs at least 20 years.
Figure 2 shows how median job tenure has
changed over time for men and women in three
age groups, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, and 45 to 54. These
data are derived from CPS Mobility Supplements
conducted in January of 1963, 1966, 1968, 1973,
1978, 1983, 1987, and 1991 and February of 1986.8
Not surprisingly, older workers typically have
longer job tenures than younger workers. Also,
men typically have longer tenures than women,
who are more likely to have interrupted their
careers for family reasons. However, our primary
interest is in the aggregate trends in these data.
For men, especially those in the two highest age
groups, median job tenures declined from 1991
to 1996, which is consistent with claims of decreased
job stability. However, women’s job tenure rose
for all age groups. So, overall, there has been rel-
atively little change in median job tenure during
the 1990s. Moreover, the drop in male tenure for
the two oldest groups seems to be mainly a con-
tinuation of a trend that was evident throughout
the 1980s. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that job
stability has suffered more than a modest decline
in the 1990s.9
Farber (1997b) shows that similar, though
somewhat more dramatic, changes took place
during the 1990s at the high end of the tenure
distribution. In particular, he shows that the
percentages of workers reporting more than
ten and 20 years of tenure declined significantly
between 1991 and 1996. The proportion of workers
aged 35 to 64 with ten or more years of tenure
declined from 38.3 percent to 35.4 percent. For
men the decline was more dramatic, from 44.3
percent to 40.0 percent, while among women,
the decline was from 31.4 percent to 30.3 per-
cent. Similar drops were reported for workers
with different educational levels. However, the
occupational groups that have historically had
the highest long-term employment levels, such
as managerial, professional and technical, and
blue-collar workers, had the largest declines in
the 1990s. Similarly, the declines were greatest
in industries, such as transportation,
communications, and public utilities,
in which long-term employment had
been most common. As a result, the
frequency of long-term employment
is now more similar across occupa-
tions and industries.
Farber’s (1997b) results, as well
as the trends in median job tenure
shown in figure 2 suggest that job
stability among men has declined
modestly during the 1990s. For women,
job stability has either declined very
modestly or continued to rise, depend-
ing on whether it is measured by
median tenure or the proportion of
workers with high tenure levels. For
both sexes, the changes appear too
modest and gradual to support the
sensationalistic media reports pro-
claiming the end of long-term em-
ployment relationships.
FIGURE 1
Distribution of job tenure for men aged 35–44,
February 1996
Source: Authors calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, Mobility Supplement, February 1996.Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 21
To reach a tenure of ten years, a worker must
survive from the first year of a job into the second,
from the second to the third, and so on for ten
years. Thus, the distribution of job tenures and,
in particular, the fraction of workers with ten or
more years of tenure can be thought of as depend-
ing on a sequence of survival probabilities going
back many years. This means that if the proba-
bility of remaining in a job for another year were
to have suddenly dropped sometime in the ear-
ly 1990s, it would take a number of years for this
change to show up fully in the tenure distribution.
In this case, results such as Farber’s (1997a) and
those shown in figure 2 might not reveal the full
extent of change. For this reason, it is of interest to
examine job survival or retention probabilities.10
Diebold, Neumark, and Polsky (1997) and
Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen (1997) have care-
fully analyzed the trend in retention rates from
the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, using data on
tenure distributions from CPS supplements for
every four years from 1983 to 1995. The authors
estimate four-year retention rates—the probabil-
ity that a worker will remain in a job an additional
four years—by dividing the number of workers
with a given set of characteristics and a certain
number of years of tenure in one survey by the
number of workers with those characteristics
but four fewer years of tenure in the survey four
years earlier. Adjustments are made for a num-
ber of potential problems, including nonresponse
to the survey, the tendency of workers to round
their tenure to a multiple of five years, the differ-
ing levels of unemployment at the time of the
surveys, and the special nature of the tenure data
derived from the February 1995 CPS Supplement
on Contingent Work.
Table 1 contains some representative results
from Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen (1997).11
Evidently, the trend over time in retention rates
depends to a great extent on workers’ initial level
of tenure. For workers with less than two years
of initial tenure, four-year retention probabilities
are estimated to have increased from 32.9 percent
for the 1983–87 period to 34.6 percent for the
1987–91 period to 39.1 percent for the 1991–95
period. However, for workers with two to less
than nine years of tenure, rates first declined
then rose slightly. The strongest evidence of a
decline in job stability comes from the group of
workers who initially had between nine and 15
years of tenure. The retention rate for these
workers declined from 81.6 percent for 1987–91
to 74.8 percent for 1991–95. Retention rates also































Median tenure, ages 25–54
FIGURE 2
Note: Shaded areas indicate recessions.
Source: Authors calculations based on data from U.S.
Department of Labor, Employee tenure in the mid-1990s,
January 30, 1997, and Farber (1998).
Four-year job retention rate estimates
Initial tenure 198387 198791 199195
0 to < 2 32.9% 34.6% 39.1%
2 to < 9 58.6 54.8 56.4
9 to < 15 82.7 81.6 74.8
15 plus 63.0 70.2 63.3
Weighted average 53.9 53.6 54.4
Source: Derived from Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen (1997).
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for workers with 15 or more years of tenure, but
returned to rates observed in the 1983–87 period.
The weighted average rate was quite stable, falling
just 0.3 percentage points from 1983–87 to 1987–91
and then increasing 0.8 percentage points from
1987–91 to 1991–95.
The results on retention probabilities are
consistent with those on tenure levels in suggesting
some modest declines in job stability for workers
with several years of tenure. Several researchers
have reported more dramatic declines in job
stability during the 1980s and/or 1990s. For
example, Boisjoly et al. (1994), Rose (1995), and
Marcotte (1996) report evidence of declining job
stability from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) data. Similarly, Swinnerton and Wial (1995)
reported significant declines in job retention rates
in the 1991–95 period. However, in our view the
combined results of Diebold et al. (1996), Swin-
nerton and Wial (1996), and Jaeger and Stevens
(1997) show that the more dramatic declines
reported in the literature were largely the result
of researchers failing to take account of occasional
changes in survey question wording. The most
careful analyses of job stability trends imply that
there have been at most modest declines in stability
in the late 1980s and 1990s.12
Research suggests, we believe, larger declines
in measures of job security. Farber (1997a) ana-
lyzes data from the seven Displaced Worker Surveys
(DWS), CPS supplements that are described in
the next section. He finds that “rates of job loss
are up substantially relative to the standard of
the last decade, particularly when some consid-
eration is given to the state of the labor market.”
He also finds that displacement rates increased
most for several groups, such as the more edu-
cated and those in white-collar occupations, that
have traditionally had relatively low levels of
displacement, which implies that displacement
has become somewhat more democratic. Changes
in the reasons workers give for their job loss
also point to especially large increases in what
the media might mean by “downsizing.” Finally,
Farber finds that the consequences of displace-
ment in terms of time spent unemployed and
reduced wage rates upon reemployment appear
to be mainly a function of the business cycle. The
consequences of displacement were worse during
the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s, but
there is little evidence of a secular increase in
the seriousness of displacement.
Valetta (1997) also finds an increasing number
of dismissals in data from the PSID, which is
consistent with Farber’s results (1997a). More-
over, Valetta’s finding that the increase is con-
centrated among workers with higher levels of
tenure is consistent with our finding below that
the increase in displacement rates for workers




Below, we present new measures of the rate
of job displacement for workers with five or
more years of tenure. We had two main goals.
First and most important, we wanted the measures
to be comparable over time so that we could
accurately judge whether displacement was in-
creasing. Given changes in the underlying survey
methodology, this is not completely straightfor-
ward and, despite our best efforts, it is possible
that certain of our measures change over time
for reasons that have nothing to do with actual
changes in the rate of job displacement. Our sec-
ond goal was to create annual time series, the
highest frequency possible, so as to be better able
to examine the relationship between displacement
and wage inflation.
Our measures of displacement are based
primarily on the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
DWS. These surveys were conducted as supple-
ments to the CPS in January of even years from
1984 to 1992 and in February 1994 and 1996.13
For the purposes of the survey, displacement is
defined as involuntary job loss not related to a
worker’s performance. Thus, displacement ex-
cludes quits and cases in which workers are dis-
charged for poor performance.14 The surveys are
retrospective, asking individuals whether they
have experienced job loss any time over the last
five years in the case of the 1984 to 1992 surveys
and over the last three years in the case of the
1994 and 1996 surveys. Thus, our earliest infor-
mation on displacement is for 1979 and our lat-
est is for 1995.
For workers who report that they were dis-
placed in the relevant time period, the DWS asks
for the specific reason for their displacement.
The possible responses are:
n Plant or company closed down or moved,
n Insufficient work,
n Position or shift abolished,
n Seasonal job completed,
n Self-operated business failed, and
n Some other reason.Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 23
This list of reasons is less than ideal. For ex-
ample, insufficient work might be the reason why
one of the other events occurred. A plant may
have closed because there was insufficient work
to do. Position or shift abolishment is probably
supposed to cover instances of “corporate down-
sizing,” but it is possible that those in nine to five
work environments will be confused by the ref-
erence to shifts. In any case, it lumps together in-
stances of complex “re-engineering” exercises,
which presumably reflect long-run organiza-
tional changes, with closings of shifts in factories,
which are more likely to be associated with
short-run declines in demand. The seasonal job
and self-employment categories don’t corre-
spond to many people’s conception of job dis-
placement and, in fact, make up only a trivial
fraction of the job loss that we consider. Finally,
perhaps because of some of the ambiguities of
the preceding categories, “other” is a common
response. In fact, growth in the “other” category
is responsible for a large percentage of the total
growth of displacement of high-seniority workers.
The first difficulty we face in constructing a
consistent measure of worker displacement is
that the DWS only collects information, such as
the year of displacement, the worker’s tenure,
and other characteristics of the lost job, for at
most one incident of displacement over the rele-
vant period. If workers were displaced twice or
more in the same period, they are instructed to
answer the additional questions for the lost job
on which they had the highest tenure. This inev-
itably leads to some undercounting of incidents
of displacement. Moreover, as Farber (1997a) notes,
the change in the length of the period over which
the DWS asks workers to report on displacement
creates a problem of comparability over time,
since the undercounting problem is more severe
when the interval covered is five years.
Farber’s approach to this problem is to exam-
ine only displacement that occurred in the last
three years of the five-year periods covered by
the 1984 to 1992 surveys. As he notes, these rates
are still not comparable to rates computed from
the three-year intervals of the 1994 and 1996 sur-
veys, because some workers may lose a job in
year one or two of the five-year period before
the survey and then lose another job in year three,
four, or five. If the workers had accumulated
less tenure on the second lost job than they had
on the first, they would be recorded as losing a
job in the 1994 and 1996 surveys, but not in the
last three years before the 1984 to 1992 surveys.
Farber’s solution is to use PSID data to quantify
the frequency of job loss patterns and adjust rates
in the DWS to offset them.15
Our approach is to restrict our analysis to
incidents of job displacement in which the affect-
ed workers had five or more years of tenure.
Obviously, it is not possible to lose two such jobs
in one three- or five-year interval, so the number
of such job loss incidents should be correctly tal-
lied no matter whether the year is part of a three-
or five-year interval in the DWS. Of course, we
will miss all displacement incidents in which
workers had less than five years of tenure. How-
ever, the consequences of job loss are not likely
to be particularly great for workers with little
tenure and, thus, our measure may capture the
most important forms of job displacement.
The DWS gives us estimates of the number
of workers with five or more years of tenure who
are displaced in a particular year. To calculate a
displacement rate, we need to divide this estimate
of the number of high-tenure displaced workers
by the number of high-tenure workers who were
at risk in that year. We derive the latter figure as
the product of the level of total employment and
the fraction of total employment accounted for
by workers with five or more years of tenure.










5 is the number of workers with five or
more years of tenure displaced in year t, nt is to-
tal employment, and ft
5 is the fraction of employ-
ment accounted for by workers with five or
more years of tenure.
As noted above, we derive estimates of dt
5
from the DWS. To estimate nt, we use the CPS
outgoing rotation files. The outgoing rotations
are those CPS members who are in the fourth
and eight months of their eight-month participa-
tion, about 25 percent in a given month. Pooling
the outgoing rotations for all 12 months of the
year yields a large data set that can be used to
estimate employment levels quite precisely. To
estimate ft
5, we use the CPS tenure supplements
described earlier. As noted, these were conduct-
ed in 1981, 1983, 1987, 1991, and 1996. To com-
pute displacement rates for 1979 and 1980, we
use the value of ft
5 from 1981. For other years in
which there was no supplement, we interpolate
linearly from the preceding and succeeding tenure
supplements. Because the fraction of workersEconomic Perspectives 24
with five years of tenure changes very slowly
relative to the number of displaced workers, this
interpolation causes no problems.
There is another problem with the 1994 and
1996 DWS. The follow-up questions on the details
of the displacement episode are not asked if
workers do not give one of the first three stan-
dard reasons for displacement. This is unfortu-
nate because, as we have already noted, a nontrivial
and growing number of workers report “other”
as their reason for displacement. To ignore workers
not responding with one of the three standard
reasons would, we feel, significantly skew our
results.16 However, for workers giving a non-
standard reason, we do not know whether they
had five years of tenure or in what year they lost
their job.
To deal with this problem, we estimated
statistical models to gauge the percentage of dis-
placed workers giving nonstandard reasons
who had five years of tenure and, of those, the
percentage who were displaced in each of the
three years covered by the surveys. The details
of our procedure are contained in box 1. The idea
is to use the displaced workers giving nonstand-
ard reasons in 1992 to determine which worker
characteristics reported in the basic CPS were
associated with having five years of tenure and
then to use those characteristics to estimate the
percentage of displaced workers reporting non-
standard reasons in the 1994 and 1996 surveys
who had five years of tenure. Similarly, we used
the workers reporting standard reasons and five
years of tenure in the 1994 and 1996 surveys to
determine the characteristics associated with
being displaced in each of the three years covered
by the surveys and then used those characteris-
tics to predict which year workers reporting
nonstandard reasons were displaced.
Table 2 shows our basic results for overall
displacement rates. The rows of the table corre-
spond to the years in which displacement occurred.
The first five columns of the table correspond to
the number of years after the displacement year
that the displacement rate was measured. For
example, the only information on the 1979 dis-
placement rate comes from the 1984 DWS, which
was conducted with a lag of five years. The esti-
mated rate, 0.96 percent, is thus shown in the
column headed five-year lag. For the majority
of years, we have multiple measures of the dis-
placement rate. For example, for 1985 we have
estimates from the 1986, 1988, and 1990 DWS.
These rates, shown in the columns for one-,
three-, and five-year lags, are estimated to be
2.29 percent, 1.79 percent, and 1.43 percent,
respectively.




Year One-year lag Two-year lag Three-year lag Four-year lag Five-year lag estimate
1979 0.96 1.46
1980 1.23 1.69
1981 1.59 1.23 1.92
1982 2.27 1.84 2.52
1983 2.41 1.66 1.52 2.25
1984 1.75 1.22 1.80
1985 2.29 1.79 1.43 2.22
1986 1.99 1.56 2.18
1987 1.83 1.34 1.34 1.84
1988 1.44 1.18 1.61
1989 1.71 1.62 1.85
1990 1.90 2.11
1991 2.76 2.35 2.83
1992 2.40 2.67
1993 2.92 2.31 2.89
1994 2.21 2.46
1995 3.44 3.44
Source: Authors calculations from data of the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 25
The results for 1985 illustrate the final diffi-
culty we face in constructing an annual measure
of job displacement for workers with five or
more years of tenure. That is, displacement rate
estimates tend to drop as the time since the sur-
vey increases. Workers seem to forget incidents
of displacement as time passes, a phenomenon
noted previously by Topel (1990) and others. As
a result, it is inappropriate to simply average the
various measures to arrive at an overall dis-
placement rate for that year. For instance, if we
were to directly compare the single estimate for
1979 with the single estimate for 1995, we would
be comparing a rate measured with a five-year
lag with a rate measured with a one-year lag.
Thus, the comparison would reflect not only
differences in actual displacement rates between
the years, but also the tendency of rates measured
with a greater lag to be lower.
Table 2 reveals that estimated displacement
rates tend to drop on average by about 11 per-
cent for each additional year that the survey lags
the year of displacement. Our solution to this
problem, which is described in detail in box 1, is
essentially to adjust rates based on lags greater
than one year upward by about 11 percent for
each additional year that the survey lags the
year of displacement. Our final estimates of the
annual displacement rates, which are shown in
the last column of table 2, are averages of all the
adjusted rates for the year in question. For in-
stance, the estimated 11 percent annual decline
suggests that if the rate for 1979 had been mea-
sured in 1980, it would have been 1.46 percent,
rather than 0.96 percent. Thus, our final estimate
for 1979 is 1.46 percent. In a year with multiple
measurements, the measures are adjusted by
different amounts, depending on how long after
the year of displacement the survey was taken.
For instance, the estimate for 1985 obtained with
a one-year lag is left at 2.29 percent, but the rate
obtained with a three-year lag is adjusted up from
1.79 percent to 2.18 percent to reflect the addi-
tional two years since the survey; the rate with a
five-year lag is adjusted from 1.43 percent to 2.17
percent to reflect the additional four years since
the survey. The adjusted rates of 2.29
percent, 2.18 percent, and 2.17 percent
are then combined to obtain the final
estimate of 2.22 percent.17
The final results are plotted over
time as the black line in figure 3, panel
A. The overall displacement rate for
workers with five years of tenure rose
during the recessions of the early 1980s
from 1.5 percent in 1979 to a peak of
2.5 percent in 1982. It then declined
during the economic expansion that
followed to a low of about 1.6 percent
in 1988. Then, in the 1990s, it rose
rather dramatically. It is not surpris-
ing that the rate should have risen
during the recession of 1990–91, but
the 1991 rate, at over 2.8 percent, was
0.3 percentage points higher than in
1982, even though by most measures
the 1982 recession was much more
severe. More noteworthy is the fail-
ure of the displacement rate to decline
during the expansion of the mid-1990s.
Indeed, in 1995 the rate shot up to
3.4 percent, its highest ever reading.
The high overall displacement rates
that we estimate for the mid-1990s are
consistent with the view that job secu-
rity declined significantly for workers

























A. Overall and standard reasons
FIGURE 3
Displacement rates, workers with 5 years tenure
Note: Shaded areas indicate recessions.
Source: Authors calculations based on data from U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Displaced Worker Survey, 198496.Economic Perspectives 26
Constructing an annual index of displacement
BOX 1
from 1992 to 1994 and 1996, and 2) the distri-
bution of year of displacement conditional
on the independent variables is the same for
workers displaced due to standard and non-
standard reasons.
The final task in computing annual dis-
placement rates is to combine rates measured
for the same year by different surveys into a
single overall rate. We did this by estimating
the following simple statistical model:
log ( ) , rs t st t st =+ - - + ag e 1
where rst is the displacement rate for year t
measured by the survey in year s, and est is
an error term assumed to have constant
variance and to be uncorrelated across ob-
servations. The parameter g measures the
rate at which estimates of displacement rates
decline as time between displacement and
the survey increases. Its estimate corresponds
to an approximately 11 percent rate of decline.
The overall rate is captured by the year of
displacement effects, a t. Specifically, the esti-
mate of the rate corresponding to a one-year
lag between displacement and the survey is
exp(at). These are the estimates shown in the
final column of table 2 and plotted in figure 3.
In order to compute estimates for sepa-
rate demographic groups, we expanded the
above model to
log ( ) , rs t dst dt dst =+- - + ag e 1
where rdst is the rate for demographic group
d in year t as measured by the DWS of year
s. The demographic specific rates are then
exp(adt). We also computed estimates of dis-
placement rates adjusted for changes in the
age and sex distribution. These were based
on models of the form
log ( ) , rs t dstk dt k dstk =+ +- - + abg e 1
where rdstk is the rate for the age and sex
group k. The presence of the bk controls for
changes in the age and sex distribution that
might affect estimates of overall rates. How-
ever, the adjusted rates were similar enough
to the unadjusted rates that we only report
the latter.
1See, for example, Maddala (1983) for an explanation of the
logistic regression model discussed below.
To estimate the fraction of workers report-
ing nonstandard reasons for displacement
in the 1994 and 1996 DWS who had five or
more years of tenure, we estimated a logistic
regression model using the sample of such
workers in the 1992 DWS.1 The dependent
variable in this model was an indicator for
having five years of tenure and the indepen-
dent variable consisted of dummy variables
for the nine census regions, sex, ten-year age
categories, race, marital status, education
less than high school, high school graduate,
some college, and college degree, as well as
part-time status, one-digit occupation, and
one-digit industry of the person’s job as re-
ported in the main CPS. We then used the
estimates of the parameters of this model,
along with the equivalent characteristics for
workers reporting nonstandard reasons for
displacement in 1994 and 1996 to form an
estimate of the probability that such workers
had five or more years of tenure at the time
of their job loss.
We estimated the fraction of such workers
that were displaced in each of the three pos-
sible years covered by the 1994 and 1996 sur-
veys by estimating a multinomial logistic
regression model on the sample of 1994 or
1996 displaced workers reporting standard
reasons for displacement. In this model, the
dependent variables were indicators for the
year of displacement and the independent
variables were the same as in the model
above. The parameter estimates were then
used to estimate the probability that work-
ers were displaced in each of the three years
covered by the 1994 and 1996 surveys.
In computing displacement rates based
on the 1994 and 1996 surveys, we then
counted all workers reporting nonstandard
reasons for displacement as displaced in all
three possible years. However, we multiplied
the weights for such individuals by the esti-
mated probabilities of having five or more
years of tenure and of being displaced in the
year in question. This procedure should pro-
vide estimates of displacement rates among
those with five years of tenure that are con-
sistent over time if 1) the relationship between
the probability of five-year tenure and the
independent variables remains constantFederal Reserve Bank of Chicago 27
The colored line in figure 3, panel A shows
the rate of displacement due to the first three
standard reasons in the survey. Comparing the
two lines, it is clear that a large part of the signif-
icant mid-1990s increase is due to an increase in
the number of displaced workers giving “other”
as their reason for displacement. However, even
the colored line, which is not dependent on the
imputations of tenure and year of displacement
described in box 1, suggests that there has been
some decline in security, especially given the level
of unemployment. The rate of displacement for
standard reasons is estimated to be higher in 1995
than it was in 1982, even though the unemploy-
ment rate was below 6 percent during most of
1995, while it was nearly 10 percent in 1982. Thus,
even when limited to displacement for standard
reasons, our results suggest a noticeable decline
in job security.
Figure 3, panel B displays separate displace-
ment rates for the three standard reasons. Evi-
dently, the rate due to firms or plants closing or
moving has declined somewhat in the 1990s,
while the rate due to slack work has remained
relatively high, given the state of the business
cycle. However, the most notable feature of fig-
ure 3, panel B is the sharp increase beginning
in 1990 of the displacement rate due to shifts or
positions being abolished. This rate, which prob-
ably comes the closest to capturing corporate
downsizing, was between 0.2 percent and 0.3
percent from 1979 to 1989, but rose to more than
0.8 percent in 1995. This two hundred or three
hundred percent increase seems to represent a
rather significant break from history.
Figure 4, panel A shows the overall dis-
placement rate for men and women. For most of
the period covered by our data, women were less
subject to displacement than men, with the typi-
cal gap in rates being five tenths or six tenths of
a percentage point. In the last three years, how-
ever, the gap has been much smaller, about one
tenth of a percentage point. Thus, by our mea-
sure, women have suffered a larger decline in
job security than men. This finding highlights
the difference between the displacement rates
estimated here and the trends in median tenure
discussed earlier. Median tenure has generally
been increasing for women relative to men.
However, tenure levels are measures of stability,
reflecting workers’ own commitment to the labor
force and individual employers in addition to forc-
es beyond workers’ control, such as displacement.
In the comparison of male and female tenure
levels, workers’ own choices are likely the more
important factor. For this reason, we would argue
that displacement rates are the better measure of
worker insecurity.
Figure 4, panel B displays displacement rates
for white and black workers. Once we restrict
the sample to workers with five or more years
of tenure, the difference between the races is rel-
atively minor. Still, there have been some changes
over time. Early in the period covered, especially
during the recession of the early 1980s, blacks
had noticeably higher displacement rates. How-
ever, by the end of the period, whites had higher
rates of displacement.
Figure 4, panel C shows the breakdown
between those with a college degree and those
without a college degree. Although displace-
ment rates for college graduates remain much
lower than those for workers without college
degrees, the gap has narrowed considerably in
the 1990s. Until 1990, displacement rates for col-
lege graduates never exceeded 1.3 percent and
the gap between them and non-graduates was
often a percentage point or more. In the 1990s,
displacement rates for college graduates rose
especially sharply, to levels of more than twice
their previous peak. Thus, the gap in displace-
ment rates between those with a college degree
and those without has narrowed considerably,
though rates for college graduates remain signif-
icantly lower.
Figure 4, panel D shows displacement rates
for blue-collar and white-collar workers. Though
displacement rates for high-tenure blue-collar
workers remain about a percentage point higher
than those for white-collar workers, the gap has
clearly shrunk during the 1990s. For instance,
even the recessions of the early 1980s had little
effect on displacement rates for high-tenure
white-collar workers, but since 1988, their rates
of job loss have approximately doubled. By con-
trast, the recessions of the early 1980s caused a
major increase in blue-collar displacement to
levels only slightly lower than in recent years.
Even more dramatic differences in displace-
ment trends are observed between more nar-
rowly defined occupations. For example, 1995
displacement rates for laborers are significantly
lower than in 1982, while those for professional
and technical workers are approximately three
times higher.Economic Perspectives 28
Figure 5 shows estimated displace-
ment rates for workers in goods pro-
ducing and service producing industries.
Again, a large gap in rates in the 1980s
has narrowed appreciably. Displace-
ment rates for those in goods produc-
ing industries are still significantly
lower than in 1982, but rates for those
in the service producing industries are
about two and half times greater. Even
so, workers in goods producing indus-
tries remain significantly more at risk
for displacement than those in service
producing industries. More dramatic
changes can be identified for certain
industries. For instance, displacement
rates for workers in the finance indus-
tries rose from about 0.5 percent to 1.0
percent in the 1980s to 2.8 percent in 1995.
The results in figures 4 and 5 all
point to the general increase in high-
tenure displacement rates having been
accompanied by a kind of democrati-
zation, in which those who had been
relatively immune to job displacement
have seen the fastest increase in displace-
ment. Previously, those with a college
education, in white-collar jobs, or in
service producing industries might
have considered themselves immune
to job loss. Given the increase in dis-
placement rates that we have estimat-
ed for these groups, this is probably
no longer the case for many such
workers. Thus, the number of workers
who feel at risk may have increased
even more than the increase in the
displacement rate would suggest.
Workers perceptions of job
security: The NORC-GSS
In a series of recent papers, Manski
(1990, 1993) has observed that researchers
know a great deal about the outcomes
that individuals or groups experience
but much less about the outcomes that
they expect. This assertion is particu-
larly relevant for job security research,
which to date has focused on the mea-
surement of displacement rates, ten-
ure distributions, and other measures
of actual employment outcomes. How-
ever, a primary issue in this literature









































D. Blue-collar and white-collar workers
FIGURE 4
Displacement rates among workers with five or more
years tenure, by demographic category
Note: Shaded areas indicate recessions.
Source: Authors calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Displaced Worker Survey, 198496.Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 29
the risk of future economic harm. Therefore,
these measures are indirect, in the sense that
expectations about risk, which are subjective in
nature, must be inferred from individual or
group realizations.18
The General Social Survey (GSS) data set
allows us to address the perceptions question
directly. Up to now, this data set has received
some attention in the popular press but little
among researchers studying job security.19 The
GSS is a nationally representative annual sur-
vey conducted by the National Opinion Research
Center (NORC). The survey asks a series of
demographic and employment questions, in-
cluding, in most years since 1977, two questions
about job security. Respondents are asked
1) “Thinking about the next 12 months, how
likely is it that you will lose your job or be laid
off—very likely, fairly likely, not too likely, or
not at all likely?” and 2) “About how easy would
it be for you to find a job with another employ-
er with approximately the same income and
fringe benefits that you now have? Would you
say very easy, somewhat easy, or not easy at all?”
Data are available for 13 years between 1977
and 1996 covering roughly 10,000 individuals.
Several years (1980, 1984, 1987) are missing
because NORC did not ask the job security
questions, and other years (1979, 1981, 1992)
are missing because the GSS was not conducted.
The sample includes all respondents who are
currently employed, English-speaking, and
aged 18 to 64. It is important to note that the
sample makes no restriction on ten-
ure because such information is not
given in the GSS. Therefore, the job se-
curity perceptions sample is not strictly
comparable to the displacement rate
sample discussed earlier. This probably
accounts for some different trends
among subsamples of the population.
The GSS does have some impor-
tant limitations.20 Most noteworthy is
that each GSS survey year consists of
an independently drawn nationally
representative sample of the popula-
tion. Thus, unlike other national sur-
veys such as the PSID, the GSS does
not allow us to observe the same
individuals across time. Surveys that
follow individuals allow the use of
panel data techniques to control for
unmeasured individual-specific char-
acteristics, such as ability or ambition,
that change across the business cycle and are cor-
related with the other variables in the model.
Such a survey format would allow us to investi-
gate the future employment dynamics of workers
and examine whether job anxiety predicts future
job displacement or wage loss.
The easiest way to see how perceptions of job
security have changed over time is to graphically
examine the responses to the GSS questions. Fig-
ure 6, panels A and B show the distribution of
responses to the two questions from 1977 to 1996.
Each line represents a separate response except
the highest line in panel A, which is the sum of
the very, fairly, and not too likely responses.
Between 30 percent and 40 percent of workers feel
some degree of insecurity about losing their job
in the next year, although only 10 percent of respon-
dents feel very or fairly sure that job loss will occur.
Between 35 percent and 50 percent of workers
respond that it would not be easy to find a compa-
rable job.
As with the displacement rates, the responses
are fairly cyclical through the early 1990s. Using
the job loss likelihood question, job security de-
clined during recessions in the early 1980s and
1990s and increased during the expansion of the
1980s. But since 1991, the percentage of workers
who answer that they are not at all likely to lose
their job has fallen, despite the strong and widely
felt expansion of the economy. Amazingly, in
1996, the fraction of workers who answered that













Goods producing and service producing
FIGURE 5
Displacement rate, by industry
Note: Shaded areas indicate recessions.
Source: Authors calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Labor,
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B. Comparable job at same pay and benefits?




















Potential for job loss and comparable reemployment
Source: Authors calculations based on data from the National
Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1997.
was equal to the percentage that answered this
way during the severe 1982–83 recession. How-
ever, most of this is due to an increase in the
percentage of workers who answer they are not
too likely to lose their job. Therefore, while there
has been a noticeable shift in worker anxiety
during this expansion, most of the change is due
to workers acknowledging some, albeit a slight,
likelihood of losing their job over the next year.
The job comparability question also tends to
be cyclical, but showed signs of breaking this
trend during the initial phase of the 1990s expan-
sion. Beginning in 1988, the percentage of workers
who answered that it would not be easy to find
a comparable job at the same pay and benefits
monotonically increased, peaking at almost 46
percent in the 1994 survey. However, in the 1996
survey, the “not easy to find a comparable job”
response declined and the percentage answering
it was easy to find a comparable job increased.
Therefore, through 1996, workers
seemed somewhat less concerned
about their chances of finding a com-
parable job, but somewhat more con-
cerned about the likelihood of losing
their current job.21
Figures 7 and 8 show the trends in
these two series by gender, race, edu-
cation, industry, and occupation. The
two primary differences between the
GSS results and the displacement rate
results are exhibited in figure 7, panels
A and B. Panel A shows that there is
no male–female gap in perceptions of
job security throughout the sample pe-
riod, while the displacement rates
showed a large male–female gap that
narrowed over time. Figure 7, panel B
displays a large black–white gap in
worker anxiety that has narrowed
somewhat over time, while figure 4
showed no significant difference in
displacement rates by race, except
during the 1982 recession. We believe
that a substantial portion of these dif-
ferences may be due to the different
tenure restrictions in the samples.
That is, while the results on displaced
workers come from a sample of work-
ers with five years of tenure, we cannot
make comparable restrictions on the
GSS sample. The importance of this
restriction is evident in other research.
For example, Fairlie and Kletzer (1997)
use the DWS to estimate displacement rate gaps
between black and white workers but make no
sample restrictions based on tenure. They find a
30 percent gap in displacement rates between the
races from 1982 and 1991. Likewise, between
1982 and 1991, the black–white gap in the GSS
job loss data is 29 percent.
On the other hand, figure 7, panels C and D
look quite similar to the displacement rate re-
sults, pointing again to a democratization of job
insecurity. White-collar and college-educated
workers were relatively immune to job anxiety
during the 1970s and 1980s, but have experienced
substantial increases in job insecurity during the
1990s. The change has been large enough to basical-
ly eliminate the gap in job insecurity between
college graduates and non-graduates. Blue-collar
workers still feel less secure than white-collar
workers, but the gap is less than half what it was
in the 1970s and early 1980s.Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 31
As shown in figure 7, panel E, job
security has declined during the 1990s
in the service sector but has remained
relatively flat (other than a temporary
drop in 1993) in the goods sector. Most
of the decline in the service industry
arises from the services, finance, in-
surance, and real estate (FIRE), and
government sectors. Analogous to the
displacement rate findings, perceptions
of job security have dropped substan-
tially in FIRE, with roughly 50 percent
fewer workers saying that they are not
at all likely to lose their job in the next
year. The lack of movement among
goods producing sectors hides some
variance between specific industries.
In particular, job insecurity (measured
by the probability of losing your job)
in manufacturing has doubled since
1989, surpassing the level of anxiety
witnessed in 1982. In 1996, job insecu-
rity in the manufacturing sector was
substantially higher than in all other
major industries. The goods sector has
not increased because agriculture and
construction workers have experienced
corresponding declines in job insecu-
rity over the past few years.
Figure 8, panel A shows the per-
centage of male and female workers
who believe it is not easy to find a com-
parable job with the same pay and ben-
efits. This graph shows a small but
persistent male–female gap that is elimi-
nated in 1996. Using this job security
measure, most of the 1990s increase in
anxiety appears to be due to female
workers. Figure 8, panel B shows that
a large black–white gap during the 1970s
and early 1980s had disappeared by
the end of the 1980s.
Figure 8, panels C and D again
display the diminishing gap in worker
anxiety between college-educated and
non-college-educated workers and
white- and blue-collar workers, respec-
tively. Panel D shows that the histori-
cally large difference between white-
and blue-collar employees all but van-
ished in 1996. White-collar workers
are among the few groups that did not
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Likelihood of job loss, by demographic category
Source: Authors calculations based on data from the National


























































Likelihood of finding comparable employment,
by demographic category
Source: Authors calculations based on data from the National
Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1997.
about finding a comparable job in
1996, reflecting increased anxiety
among professional workers. In 1996,
42 percent of professional workers re-
sponded that it was not easy to find a
comparable job, up from 30 percent
in 1989, matching the percentage that
answered that way during the 1982
recession.
Finally, the 1996 drop in anxiety
about finding a comparable job is
mainly from the goods sector (figure
8, panel E). Anxiety about finding a
comparable job for service sector em-
ployees peaked in 1994, but remains
slightly above the levels seen during
the last expansion. Nearly every group
believed it would be easier to find a
comparable job in 1996 than in 1994,
exceptions being government employ-
ees and professional and sales workers.
Controlling for population
characteristics
The results presented thus far are
based on raw data. However, other
changes in the work force during the
last 20 years, including shifts in the
age and educational distribution of
U.S. workers, may be confounding the
time trends in worker anxiety. Is the
trend in worker anxiety by industry,
occupation, or education the same
even after simultaneously controlling
for multiple characteristics of the pop-
ulation? To find out, we estimate
“ordered probit” regressions, an ap-
propriate statistical technique for this
problem because it accounts for the
discrete and ordered nature of the job
security questions. The details of the
estimation procedure are described
in box 2.
Table 3 reports the coefficients,
standard errors, and marginal effects
from a specification that uses the like-
lihood of losing your job as the depen-
dent variable and industry, occupation,
year, gender, race, age, marital status,
education, and region dummies as
controls.22 The marginal effects mea-
sure the impact of a change in some
variable, say whether the individual
is a sales worker, on the probabilityFederal Reserve Bank of Chicago 33
Ordered probit regressions
BOX 2
The ordered probit model is based on a latent regression such as
where yi
* is the unobserved job insecurity of person i, xi  are demographic and other individu-
al characteristics of person i and ei  is a person-specific error term. The parameter b is a vector
of coefficients that measure the average impact of the demographic variables on the level of
job security. While we do not observe yi
*, we do observe the k possible answers allowed by the































For example, in the GSS likelihood of losing your job question, yi
  = 0 corresponds to an-
swering “not at all likely to lose my job,” while yi
  = 3 corresponds to the “very likely to lose my
job” answer. The mi’s are unknown intercept parameters to be estimated in the model.
Assuming a normal distribution in the error term, we can calculate the probability of each





































where F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. From equation 2, we can
calculate the marginal effect (the impact of a change in the x variable on the probability of
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where f is the standard normal density function and the x variables are measured at their
mean value. Equation 3 essentially calculates the effects of changes in the covariates on the cell
probabilities.
It should be noted that many of the independent variables in our models are 0–1 indica-
tors, such as whether the individual is a college graduate. In this case, the marginal effect is
calculated as the difference between the cell probabilities when the event occurs (a college
graduate) and when the event does not occur (not a college graduate):
Prob Prob (, )(, ) , yj x yj x =¢- =¢ 10
where x¢,1 is the vector of covariates where the college graduate variable is set to 1 and  x¢,0 is
the vector of covariates where the college graduate variable is set to 0.
1) yx ii i
* , =+ beEconomic Perspectives 34
Marginal effect on base case probability
Standard Not at all Not too Fairly Very
Coefficient error likely likely likely likely
Base case probabilitya 0.697 0.225 0.046 0.032
Agriculture 0.069 0.097 0.024 0.014 0.005 0.005
Construction 0.322 0.070* 0.120 0.062 0.027 0.031
Manufacturing 0.234 0.054* 0.086 0.046 0.019 0.021
Transportation, 0.058 0.066 0.021 0.012 0.004 0.004
  communications, and utilities
Wholesale trade 0.021 0.084 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.002
Retail trade 0.128 0.057* 0.046 0.026 0.010 0.010
Finance, insurance, and real estate 0.060 0.069 0.021 0.012 0.004 0.004
Services 0.079 0.050 0.028 0.016 0.006 0.006
Professional, technical 0.148 0.047* 0.049 0.030 0.010 0.009
Managerial 0.264 0.049* 0.085 0.053 0.017 0.015
Sales 0.119 0.056* 0.040 0.024 0.008 0.008
Craftsman 0.014 0.052 0.005 0.003 0.000 0.000
Operative or laborer 0.165 0.047* 0.060 0.033 0.013 0.014
Service worker 0.126 0.048* 0.042 0.026 0.009 0.008
1978 0.125 0.062* 0.042 0.026 0.009 0.008
1982 0.194 0.061* 0.071 0.039 0.016 0.017
1983 0.236 0.060* 0.087 0.046 0.019 0.021
1985 0.089 0.060 0.032 0.018 0.007 0.007
1986 0.018 0.062 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.001
1988 0.034 0.069 0.012 0.007 0.002 0.002
1989 0.062 0.070 0.021 0.013 0.004 0.004
1990 0.022 0.070 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.002
1991 0.147 0.067* 0.053 0.029 0.012 0.012
1993 0.184 0.066* 0.067 0.037 0.015 0.016
1994 0.121 0.057* 0.044 0.024 0.009 0.010
1996 0.151 0.056* 0.055 0.030 0.012 0.013
Female 0.035 0.029 0.012 0.007 0.003 0.003
Black 0.265 0.039* 0.098 0.052 0.022 0.024
Other race 0.095 0.070 0.034 0.019 0.007 0.007
Age 1824 0.031 0.043 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.002
Age 4465 0.130 0.029* 0.044 0.027 0.009 0.008
Never married 0.111 0.034* 0.040 0.022 0.009 0.009
Divorced 0.024 0.037 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.002
Separated 0.198 0.064* 0.072 0.039 0.016 0.017
Widowed 0.181 0.076* 0.066 0.036 0.014 0.015
High school dropout 0.124 0.038* 0.044 0.025 0.010 0.010
College graduate 0.024 0.038 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.002
Graduate school graduate 0.055 0.056 0.019 0.011 0.004 0.004
New England 0.120 0.064 0.040 0.024 0.008 0.008
Mid-Atlantic 0.008 0.046 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000
East North Central 0.093 0.044* 0.032 0.019 0.006 0.006
East South Central 0.040 0.059 0.014 0.008 0.003 0.003
South Atlantic 0.045 0.044 0.016 0.009 0.003 0.003
West North Central 0.077 0.055 0.026 0.016 0.005 0.005
West South Central 0.032 0.052 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.002
Mountain 0.116 0.058* 0.042 0.023 0.009 0.009
Intercept 1b 0.517 0.077*
Intercept 2b 1.420 0.078
Intercept 3b 1.849 0.079*
Log likelihood 18,316
Sample size 9,935
* = significant at the 5% level.
aBase case is a white, married male, aged 25 to 44, high school graduate, who worked a clerical government job in the Pacific
region in 1977. Industry, occupation, region, and year dummies are relative to government (industry), clerical (occupation),
Pacific (region), and 1977 (years).
bEach response has its own intercept. See box 2 for details. The three intercept terms are used to compute the marginal
 effects for the four categories of responses (final four columns).
Note: Dependent variable is the likelihood of losing your job in the next year. The possible answers are not at all likely,
not too likely, fairly likely, and very likely.
Source: Authors calculations based on data from the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, various years.
Likelihood of losing your current job in the next year: Ordered probit analysis
TABLE 3Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 35
of the individual responding to the job security
questions in a particular way. The results are re-
ported relative to a base case white, married,
male, high school graduate, aged 25 to 44, who
worked in a clerical job in the government in
1977. The first row shows that the probability of the
base case person responding that he is not at all
likely to lose his job is 69.7 percent. The third
row, Construction, reveals that the probability of
a not at all likely response from a clerical worker
in the construction industry is 12.0 percentage
points lower (or 57.7 percent) than for a clerical
worker in the government in 1977.
Overall, the table shows that many of the
characteristics that look significant in the univari-
ate graphs, such as occupation and race, remain
significant indicators, even after controlling for
the demographic and employment variables.
This is also true of ordered probit regressions
where the comparable job question is the depen-
dent variable. Table 3 gives further detail on the
specific industry and occupational groups that
traditionally experience higher levels of job anx-
iety, including workers in the construction and
manufacturing sectors and operatives and laborers
in all industries. While the probability of mana-
gerial workers responding that they are not at
all likely to lose their job is 78.2 percent, the same
probability for an operative or laborer is 63.7
percent. These industry and occupational differ-
ences are statistically significant.
We can test whether job security has changed
over this expansion by calculating time trend
effects within the ordered probit framework.
The rows labeled 1978 to 1996 in table 3 show
the results of such an exercise. As with the sim-
ple univariate graphs, perceptions of job security
have been quite low since 1991 when measured
by the likelihood of job loss. Controlling for de-
mographic, industry, and occupation shifts cannot
explain the recent high insecurity felt by workers.
Job anxiety remains on the order of that seen
during the last two recessions.
Also, we stratified the sample by gender, race,
education, occupation, and industry and ran sep-
arate ordered probit regressions for different
categories of workers. The purpose of this exer-
cise is to see whether the time trends reported
in the graphs still exist after controlling for other
demographic, industrial, and occupational struc-
tural shifts. By running separate regressions for
each demographic group, we allow the parame-
ters on other covariates to change across groups.
This flexible specification allows, say, the effect
of being married to exert a different influence on
perceptions of job security for high school drop-
outs and college graduates. However, the main
inferences from these results (not shown) do not
change much. The recent trend in increased job
anxiety arises primarily from better educated
and white-collar workers. On the other hand,
workers who are high school dropouts are more
secure about their job in 1996 than at any other
time since 1977, with the exception of 1989, the
end of the 1980s expansion. Managerial and pro-
fessional workers have witnessed increases in
job insecurity, while there is no statistical trend
apparent in other detailed occupations. Increased
anxiety appears in manufacturing, services, and
government, while construction workers, who
have traditionally had a high probability of job loss
because of the seasonal nature of the work, have
seen an increase in job security during the 1990s.
Lastly, we looked at the perceptions of job
loss among a few nonstandard groups of workers.
Table 4 reports the coefficients, standard errors,
and marginal effects from additional variables
that are asked (sometimes periodically) in the
GSS or are computed from other data sources.
The first group of variables is other work charac-
teristics, including union membership, the size
of the employee’s work site, whether the firm
pays fringe benefits, whether the organization
has gone through a merger or reorganization
during the last five years, computer usage in the
industry, and employment conditions in the in-
dustry and region. The second group of variables
lists several hardships that individuals have
recently experienced, including poverty, unem-
ployment, work problems, financial problems,
other hardships, and health problems. The letter
at the beginning of each row indicates a separate
regression that includes all of the demographic
and employment variables reported in table 3.
The sample sizes from each of these regressions
are reported in column 1. Since some questions
begin to be asked after 1977, all marginal effects
are calculated relative to the same base case per-
son in the first year that the question is included
in the GSS.
The first row shows that union members are
likely to be more insecure about their future job
prospects than nonunion members even after
controlling for compositional differences in oc-
cupation and industry between the groups.  This
finding may be confounded by the choice to joinEconomic Perspectives 36
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Marginal effect on base case probability
Sample Standard  Not at all Not too Fairly Very
Other variables size Coefficient error likely likely likely likely
Work characteristics
a. Union member 4,761 0.124 0.049* 0.040 0.025 0.008 0.007
b. Current organization merged 550 0.209 0.132 0.080 0.039 0.019 0.022
c. Current organization reorganized 552 0.123 0.120 0.046 0.024 0.011 0.012
d. No fringe benefits 463 0.491 0.196* 0.193 0.077 0.042 0.074
Size of work site
e. 19 employees 3,079 0.158 0.079* 0.060 0.032 0.013 0.015
e. 1049 employees 3,079 0.107 0.078 0.041 0.021 0.009 0.011
e. 100499 employees 3,079 0.076 0.080 0.029 0.015 0.006 0.008
e. 500+ employees 3,079 0.031 0.081 0.012 0.006 0.003 0.003
f. Region unemployment ratea 9,935 0.086 0.019* 0.026 0.016 0.005 0.005
g. Industry unemployment ratea 9,935 0.029 0.020 0.010 0.006 0.002 0.002
h. Industry computer useb 9,529 0.193 0.078* 0.070 0.039 0.015 0.015
Work and other problems
i. Below the poverty line 7,620 0.352 0.051* 0.132 0.066 0.031 0.035
j. Unemployment spell in last 5 yrs. 3,946 0.448 0.045* 0.135 0.090 0.026 0.020
k. Unemployment spell in last 10 yrs. 5,752 0.403 0.035* 0.135 0.083 0.029 0.023
l. Problems at work 281 0.004 0.184 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
l. Financial problems 281 0.124 0.216 0.043 0.028 0.010 0.006
l. Other hardships 281 0.535 0.219* 0.201 0.110 0.052 0.039
m. Not healthy 5,292 0.229 0.047* 0.087 0.043 0.020 0.025
* = significant at the 5% level.
aIndustry and regional unemployment rates are calculated from the March 197796 Current Population Survey.
bIndustry computer use is from Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1997). They calculate the share of computer users by three-digit Standard Industrial
Classification codes from the October 1984, 1989, and 1993 Current Population Survey. The computer use data are linearly interpolated
between 1984 and 1993, set at 1984 levels in year prior to 1984, and at 1993 levels in years post 1983.
Notes: The letter at the beginning of each row indicates a separate regression that includes all of the control variables listed in table 3. The base
case is the same as table 3. If the variables listed in this table were not reported in 1977, the base case is the first year the question was asked.
Except for the unemployment rates and the computer usage variable, the marginal effects are reported as the difference between the base case
where the characteristic is not present (say, the respondent is not a union member) and where the characteristic is present (is a union member).
The size of work site coefficients are relative to a company with 5099 employees. See box 2. The base case probabilities, which are not reported,
are available upon request.
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1997.
a union (workers who are more insecure about
their future employment are more likely to join
unions) and therefore suffers from what econo-
metricians call endogeneity bias. It is a bit sur-
prising, because much of the research on unions
suggests that union workers are less sensitive
to business cycles because wages and employ-
ment are set in multiyear contracts. However,
union wages have been growing slower than
nonunion wages recently, suggesting that workers
are concerned enough about job security that
they are willing to trade off wage growth for
more security. Furthermore, the decline in
union membership over the last few decades
could signal reduced bargaining power of union
employees.
In a way, the union results are similar to some
limited evidence on workers in organizations
undergoing change. In 1991, the GSS included
information on whether a respondent’s firm
has gone through a merger or a reorganization.
Because we only have one year of data, the pre-
cision of the point estimates is low. Neverthe-
less, the magnitude of the marginal effects is
consistent with stories about restructuring and
downsizing leading to more insecurity during
the 1990s. Unfortunately, because the sample is
redrawn each year, we cannot test whether these
workers have faced greater job loss frequencies
in subsequent years.
In regressions that add the size of the em-
ployee’s work site, the results suggest that those
who work at smaller sites are less likely to be
concerned about their job. However, the question
asks the size of the work site not the size of the
organization.Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 37
compensation during this tight labor market
expansion is one of the driving forces behind
public policy concerns about job security. Many
analysts argue that workers have sacrificed
wage growth for a more secure relationship
with their current employers.
To investigate this question, we follow an
estimation strategy pursued in Blanchflower
and Oswald (1994), among others. In particular,
we look cross-sectionally as well as over time
and ask whether census regions that have had
higher displacement rates or worker perceptions
of insecurity have tended to have lower wage
growth. The regressions that we use are similar
to the original Phillips curve, which posits a
negative relationship between the rate of wage
change and the contemporaneous unemploy-
ment rate.24
We use three wage measures, annual, weekly,
and hourly earnings, that are computed from
the 1977 to 1996 March CPS. However, our pre-
ferred wage measure is hourly earnings, because
it does not confound changes in wages with
changes in hours worked. This is an important
distinction because annual hours are highly cor-
related with the job security measures (as well
as unemployment rates). Therefore, we have to
be careful to distinguish a wage effect from a labor
supply (hours) effect. This is probably less of a
concern with the weekly measure.
We include controls for one of two job secu-
rity measures (a security index calculated from
the GSS and a displacement rate calculated from
the DWS), the contemporaneous unemployment
rate (calculated from the March CPS), and time-
and location-specific indicator variables. The time-
and location-specific variables account for unex-
plained characteristics of wages that are common
across time and regions (essentially, they allow
the intercept term to vary over time and region).
For example, the time variables will account for
changes in productivity growth and expectations
of inflation that are common across regions
within the U.S. Box 3 gives the technical details
of our estimation procedure.
Table 5 highlights some of our findings. Panels
A and B are from separate regressions. The secu-
rity measure is the insecurity index in panel A,
and the log displacement rate in panel B.
The wage effect is reasonably consistent across
the two job security measures. The coefficients
(since the variables are measured in logs, the
coefficients are elasticities) suggest that, using the
annual earnings measure, a 10 percent increase
When we add industry and regional unem-
ployment rates to the statistical model, we find,
not surprisingly, that workers in regions and, to
a much smaller extent, industries that are expe-
riencing higher unemployment are less secure
about their own prospects. (The unemployment
rates are calculated from the March CPS.)
Finally, we add a variable that measures the
share of computer users in each individual’s
three-digit SIC industry. The data are compiled
by Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1997) using the
October 1984, 1989, and 1993 CPS. As part of the
Education Supplements, the three CPS surveys asked
workers whether they used a computer at work,
where a computer is defined as a desktop terminal
or PC and not a hand-held data device or electron-
ic cash register. We interpolate computer shares
by industry between the 1984 and 1993 end dates
and hold years before 1984 and after 1993 constant
at the 1984 and 1993 levels. Surprisingly, the re-
sults suggest that workers in industries that are
more computer intensive are less secure about
their jobs, after controlling for demographics,
time, industry, and occupation.23 When the com-
puter usage variable is interacted with the time
dummies, it becomes apparent that this computer
industry–job insecurity correlation is driven by
the 1993 to 1996 period. Prior to the 1990s, there
is a positive relationship between working in a
computer-intensive industry and job security.
Unfortunately, we have no data on whether the
individual respondents are computer users.
The bottom of table 4 reports the parameters
from the “problem” variables. Many of these
coefficients are significant and negative, suggest-
ing that job insecurity goes hand-in-hand with
other work- and non-work-related problems.
Furthermore, the large effects from previous
unemployment suggest that these workers are
more prone to insecurity than those who have
not experienced a spell of unemployment in the
last ten years. This result suggests that past job
loss may be a reasonable indicator of future anx-
iety and is consistent with studies that use dis-
placement rates as an indicator of job security.
However, the results on past unemployment
may be driven by unobserved characteristics,
such as ability.
Job security and wage growth
While a number of papers have measured
recent trends in job security or stability, none
that we are aware of attempt to link these trends
to wage growth. Yet the allegedly slow rise inEconomic Perspectives 38
in the job security measure results in a 0.2 per-
cent decline in wage growth. This is statistically
significant at conventional levels. However, the
hourly wage coefficient implies that about half of
this decrease is a wage effect and the other half is
an hours-worked effect. Furthermore, the wage
effect is imprecisely enough estimated that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the true effect is
zero. However, if this effect is real, the impact on
nominal wage growth during the 1990s has been
fairly large. Referring to figure 3, displacement
rates rose from around 2.0 percent in the 1980s
The impact of job security on wage growth
BOX 3
The wage-job security relationship is esti-
mated from a regression of the form:
4) wyUw rt rt rt rt r t rt =++ + + + - al j 1vvv ,
where wrt is the log wage, yrt is a measure of
the level of job security, and Urt is the log un-
employment rate. The variables are aggregat-
ed into a market  r at time  t. We aggregate
individuals into the nine census regions since
geographical labor markets smaller than re-
gions are not available in the GSS. The wage
and unemployment measures are computed
from the 1977 to 1996 March Current Popula-
tion Surveys (CPS). The annual earnings mea-
sure is a sum of all income earned in the
previous year. The weekly earnings measure
is calculated as annual earnings divided by
the number of weeks worked in the previous
year. The hourly earnings measure is calcu-
lated as annual earnings divided by the num-
ber of weeks worked in the previous year
times the number of hours worked per week
in the previous year.
There are several ways to estimate equa-
tion 4. Perhaps the simplest way is to aver-
age all individuals in market r at time t and
use the cell means as the observation unit.
This is essentially what was done for the
displacement rates (see box 1). However, the
standard errors will be biased downward
because common unmeasured factors of in-
dividuals may be attributed to local employ-
ment conditions (Moulton, 1990). Instead,
for the job loss likelihood index, we use a
“two-step” procedure. In the first step, we
estimate ordered probit regressions like
equation 1 in box 2 but augment them to al-
low a calculation of a region-specific security
index for each year. In particular, we regress
the loss likelihood responses, yi
*, on demo-
graphics (Xit), and year interacted with re-
gion dummies (Ritvt):
yX v it it it t it R
* . =+ + bd e
The vector of region–year dummy coeffi-
cients (d) is equivalent to the mean residuals
by year and region and can be interpreted as
indexes of job insecurity, after controlling for
differences in education, gender, age, in-
come, and marital status of workers in partic-
ular areas. We also run the final wage
equations with job security indexes that are
not demographically adjusted and find that
this adjustment does not make a significant
difference to the inferences.
The wage variables are estimated from a
log wage equation of the form:
ln wX irt =+ bm irt irt.
Again, the X matrix controls for educa-
tion, marital status, and other standard human
capital controls. We use the mean residual by
region and year (mrt) as a measure of the wage
adjusted for these demographics.
In the second step, we estimate ordinary
least squares regressions of the mean residu-
al from the first stage wage equation (mrt) on
the contemporaneous unemployment rate
(Urt), the lagged dependent variable, the secu-
rity index (drt), and region and year indicator
variables (or fixed effects):
ma dl j m rt rt rt rt r t rt Uv v v =++ + + + - 1 .
The sample size varies depending on the
job security index that is used. The regres-
sions that include the displacement rate are
run on 17 years (17 years times nine regions
equals 153 observations) and the regressions
that include the security index are run on 13
years (117 observations).Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 39
Relationship between wages and job security
TABLE 5
Change in Change in Change in
log annual earnings log weekly earnings log hourly earnings
No region Region No region Region No region Region
controls controls controls controls controls controls
A. (sample size = 117)
Insecurity index 0.018 0.010 0.013 0.007 0.013 0.008
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
Log unemployment rate 0.029 0.048 0.029 0.045 0.024 0.040
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013)
B. (sample size = 153)
Log displacement rate 0.021 0.018 0.020 0.017 0.010 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Log unemployment rate 0.028 0.052 0.028 0.051 0.026 0.044
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011)
Notes: All regressions include year controls. See text for explanation of variables and sample. The unit of observation
is the nine census regions.
Sources: Authors calculations based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, 1996;
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Displaced Worker Survey, 198496; and the National Opinion Research Center,
General Social Survey, 1997.
to 2.75 percent in the early 1990s to almost 3.5
percent in 1995. Using a job insecurity wage
elasticity estimate of –0.01, this suggests that job
insecurity lowered wage growth by 0.3 percent-
age points a year in the early 1990s and roughly 0.7
percentage points in 1995, relative to what would
have happened if displacement rates had stayed
at the 1980s level. The job anxiety index grew ap-
proximately 25 percent during the 1990s, suggest-
ing a 0.3 percentage point decline in wages per year
from the results in table 5, panel A. However, our
estimates for hourly wages cannot reject the pos-
sibility that these effects arose purely by chance.
Our analysis is just a first step in estimating
the impact of job security on wage inflation. There
is much more work to be done on this question.
First, we plan to explore micro-data-based tech-
niques to solve technical problems associated
with having two measures, such as wage growth
and job security, that are jointly determined.
Second, as it is currently measured, the security
index encompasses a fair amount of noise or
measurement error. This measurement error
leads to a downward bias in the wage–security
relationship. Finally, a key question is causation.
Does high job security cause high wages or vice
versa? This question could be examined by esti-
mating vector autoregressive models, which allow
a flexible relationship between wages, unemploy-
ment, and job security.
Conclusion
Our review of the literature and our new
results on displacement for high-tenure workers
reveal a modest decline in job stability and a larger
decline in job security, especially for workers
with higher levels of job tenure. Apparently,
some of the increases in displacement that have
been observed in the 1990s have been offset by
declines in quit rates. The higher displacement
rates suggest that workers have more reason to
be worried about their job security in the 1990s,
and the lower quit rates suggest they may be
less confident about their job prospects. Consis-
tent with these findings, our tabulations of
workers’ evaluations of their chances of job loss
reveal a noticeable increase in the proportion of
workers who feel that they are at least at some
risk of job loss.
When we relate variations in displacement
rates and anxiety levels over time and across
census divisions to the corresponding variations
in wage growth, we find estimates of the effect
of insecurity on wages that would be large
enough to explain all or most of the puzzle of
slow wage growth in the 1990s. Of course, these
estimates are rather imprecise and may even
have arisen by chance. Still, we believe that these
results add to the case for worker insecurity hav-
ing restrained wage growth and justify further
research on the topic.Economic Perspectives 40
1Greenspan (1997).
2Reich (1997).
3See, for example, Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997).
4The manner in which workers and employers are matched to
each other has changed quite noticeably in the 1990s. The pro-
cess may have been made more efficient by the rapid expansion
of the temporary services industry. (See Segal and Sullivan,
1995, 1997). Also, Internet job postings may make interregional
job search more efficient. Such developments may reduce the
likelihood of bottlenecks and spot labor shortages that contrib-
ute to inflationary pressures. Or, in the language of the short-
run Phillips curve, we can argue that they have reduced the
natural rate of unemployment independently of any increase in
worker anxiety.
5New York Times (1996).
6Notable contributions to this literature include Podursky and
Swaim (1987), Kletzer (1989), Topel (1990), Ruhm (1991), and
Jacobson et al. (1993a, 1993b, 1993c). Fallick (1996) and Kletzer
(1997) provide recent surveys of this literature.
7The CPS is a monthly mini-census of about 45,000 households
that is the source for such familiar statistics as the unemploy-
ment rate. When appropriately weighted to account for the
scientifically designed sampling procedures employed by the
BLS, the CPS yields nationally representative estimates.
8The figures are taken from U.S. Department of Labor (1997)
and Farber (1998).
9Tenure data were also collected as part of the CPS Pension and
Benefits Supplements of May 1979 and April 1993. The latter,
which found higher median tenure for most age and sex
groups than the Mobility Supplement of January 1991, support-
ed the conclusion of Farber (1998) that job durations were rela-
tively stable in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the tenure data
from the Pension and Benefits Supplements are based on a slight-
ly different question than those from the Mobility Supplements.
The latter asks how long workers have been continuously em-
ployed by their current employers, while the former simply
asks how long workers have been employed by their current
employers. Omitting the condition that the employment be
continuous could raise the tenure estimates. Suppose a worker
was employed by a firm for five years, left for two years, and
then returned for another five. In the Mobility Supplements, in
which the question refers to continuous employment, the
worker is likely to report a tenure of five years. However, in the
Pension and Benefits Supplements, in which the question simply
asks workers how long they have worked for their employers,
the worker is likely to report a tenure of ten years. Thus, it is
possible that some or all of the higher tenure reading in the
1993 survey was due to the omission of the word continuous in
the key question rather than an actual increase in job stability.
Changes in question wording also complicate the interpreta-
tion of the trends in figure 2. Before 1983, the Mobility Supple-
ments asked workers when they started working for their
current employers. Tenure was then calculated based on work-
ers’ responses. Since 1983, workers have been asked how long
they have continuously worked for their current employers,
which yields the tenure information directly. Of course, if
workers correctly answered all questions, it would make no
difference whether tenure was solicited directly or calculated
from the start date of their jobs. But workers do not always re-
port accurately; figure 1 shows that workers have a tendency to
report tenures that are multiples of five years. In the earlier
Mobility Supplements, there was a tendency to report start years
that were multiples of five, such as 1960, 1965, and so on. This
change compromises the comparability of the data over time.
10Hall (1982) studied retention probabilities using data from
a single cohort which, as shown by Ureta (1992), requires a
stable rate of job beginnings, as well as a stable set of retention
probabilities.
11Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen (1997) report several alterna-
tive estimates of retention probabilities. Those shown in table 1
are, we believe, their preferred estimates.
12The lack of a major decline in job stability is also consistent
with the work of Stewart (1997), who analyzed the March CPS
annual demographic files and found no increase in the rate of
job change from the previous calendar year.
13See Hipple (1997).
14Of course, since this is a survey of individuals, there may be
instances in which respondents misreport by saying, for exam-
ple, that they were displaced when they were actually fired.
Such mismeasurement is possible with any household survey.
15The PSID has a number of advantages for studying turnover
and displacement. Unfortunately, the sample size is too small
to estimate disaggregated rates. Thus, Farber computes a single
set of adjustment factors that he applies to all workers.
16Tabulations, such as those in Hipple (1997), that do not count
workers displaced for nonstandard reasons do not show an in-
crease in the current period comparable to what we find below.
17Our procedure yields what we believe to be consistent com-
parisons across years. It is possible, however, that the overall
level of the estimates could be off by some constant percentage.
Suppose, for example, that the reason the displacement rates
decline by 11 percent for each additional year that the survey
lags the year of displacement is not that the rates measured
with a one-year lag are correct and the other years reflect
forgetting, but that the rates measured five years later are
correct and earlier surveys reflect “spurious remembering.”
(In our opinion, this is a much less likely scenario but one that
we obviously can’t rule out.) Then our estimates will all be
too high by about 52 percent (11 percent compounded for four
years), but the pattern across years will be unaffected.
NOTESFederal Reserve Bank of Chicago 41
18Some observers (for example, Neumark and Polsky, 1997) ar-
gue that attitudinal questions about job security may not pro-
vide convincing evidence of actual job loss if perceptions are
formed from misinformation. They point out that much of the
reporting on job security relies on anecdotal evidence and,
therefore, is not based on random sampling. It is always possi-
ble to find someone who is struggling, even in a booming econ-
omy. During the early 1990s, the recession hit journalists and
editors, as well as other white-collar workers especially hard,
perhaps resulting in more stories about displacement than
were warranted. Since press reports may help form percep-
tions of the chance of job loss among readers, there is the dan-
ger that we might observe an increase in perceptions of job
insecurity that has little to do with actual job loss.
19An exception is Schmidt and Thompson (1997). Several poll-
ing agencies, such as Gallup and Yankelovich, and survey
organizations, such as the University of Michigan Survey
Research Center (SRC), have also been soliciting perceptions
of worker security over the last two decades. See Otoo (1997)
for an analysis of the SRC data. Dominitz and Manski (1997)
describe the new Survey of Economic Expectations, which asks
respondents their level of concern about losing their job, losing
part of their income, losing their health insurance, and being
victimized by a burglary. However, this survey began in 1994
and therefore provides no information on longer-term trends in
job security.
20See Dominitz and Manski (1997) for a criticism of the wording
of the GSS questions.
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